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I.
INTRODUCTION
As demonstrated in Appellants' briefs, this Court should reverse the Court of
Appeals' ruling in Lawrence Colosimo and Jean Colosimo v. Gateway Community

Church, 2016 UT App 195, 382 P.3d 667 (the "Opinion") and remand the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine other issues.
In its Opposition brief ("Opposition"), Appellee Gateway Community Church
("Gateway") concedes numerous material points made in Appellants' brief concerning
the Opinion's errors.
Gateway concedes that public safety ordinances can create duties, independent of
common law duties, even toward trespassers. However, it argues that the Draper City
Ordinance (Addenda B, C and D to Appellants' Opening Br.) cannot create such a duty
because the class of persons it seeks to protect is allegedly too "general." Gateway cites
no law for this proposition. In fact, consistent with the well-established law in Utah and
other jurisdictions, this Court in Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48,309 P.3d 216,
recently found duties to "wrongdoers" to whom no common law duty was otherwise
owed, applying a similar, if not even more "general" public safety statute.
The Opinion disregarded the applicable law and instead created and applied a new
and erroneous "strict construction" standard which requires legislative enactments to
contain an explicit statement that common law was modified and a "list of defenses," in
order for a duty to attach. Applying the correct Utah law, this Court should find that
Gateway owed an independent duty under the Draper City Ordinance to Adam, because

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Adam was, by the plain language of the Ordinance, included in the class whom the
Ordinance sought to protect.
Gateway's recycled hypothetical about liability to "burglars in the crawlspace of a
private home" is also misplaced. This case involves a child being electrocuted by coming
into contact with the easily accessible roof of Gateway's one-story commercial building
which even Gateway's own board member agreed was essentially a public place. Adam
was electrocuted and died because Gateway, undisputedly, failed to comply with a
municipal ordinance intended to protect the public, including trespassers, from the
potential dangers of electric outdoor signs.
As to Appellants' common law claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts section
339, Gateway concedes that the Court of Appeals ruled contrary to Gateway's material
concession that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gateway knew
that children were likely to trespass onto Gateway's roof. Because this is the only
element the Court of Appeals considered with respect to Section 339, this Court should
reverse the ruling on Section 339 and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider
the remaining Section 339 elements.
With regard to the common law claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts
sections 334 and 335, Gateway also concedes that the lower courts did not require
Gateway to first demonstrate an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Gateway lmew or had a reason to know of habitual trespassers on its roof and that they
ignored Gateway's concession as to likely children trespassers on its roof.

2
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In an effort to defend these errors, Gateway misconstrues the controlling law
concerning burdens on motions for summary judgment which this Court articulated in
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P .3d 600 and Connor v. Union Pac., 972 P .2d 414

(Utah 1998). In that regard, Gateway claims that the lower courts were correct that
Gateway did not have the initial burden to demonstrate an absence of genuine issues of
material fact on its motion. Gateway also claims its concession as to likely children
trespassers on its roof is irrelevant to the analysis concerning habitual trespassers.
Gateway even claims that the concession was not about whether children were likely to
trespass onto Gateway's roof, but about children generally climbing roofs. Gateway's
arguments are not well taken.
The well-established precedents make clear that the Opinion erred when it ignored
Gateway's concession as to likely children trespassers on Gateway's roof and Gateway's
failure to meet its initial burden to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues on the
questions of whether Gateway had a reason to know of habitual trespassers.
The Opinion also erroneously ignored the abundant circumstantial evidence
Appellants presented (despite having no obligation to do so under Orvis and Connor)
demonstrating that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gateway had
reason to know of habitual trespassers on its roof under Restatement Sections 334 and
335. Instead, the Opinion created a bright-line rule pertaining to Sections 334 and 335
that admitted knowledge of two trespassing incidents is insufficient, as a matter of law, to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to landowner's knowledge concerning habitual
trespassers, regardless of any circumstantial evidence. Utah courts have never endorsed
3
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such bright-line rules, and this Court should also refuse to do so here. The reversal of the
Opinion's rulings on Restatement Sections 334 and 335 is necessary to correct the
Opinion's errors.
Finally, Gateway invites this Court to rule on "alternate grounds" and to go
beyond the scope of Appellants' petition and the Court of Appeals' Opinion. This Court
should decline Gateway's request because it is contrary to the Utah law which restricts
the Supreme Court's review on certiorari to a review of on1y the issues raised in the
Petition for Certiorari and the rulings made by the Court ofAppeals. As Gateway
admits, the Opinion specifically and only addressed the above referenced two issues: (1)
the issue of duty under the Ordinance; and (2) whether there were genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Gateway lmew or had reason to know about likely children
trespassers or habitual trespassers on its roof. Appellants' petition did the same. As
such, much of Gateway's Opposition should be disregarded, and the proper course of
action is to remand these "alternate" issues for consideration by the Court of Appeals.

II.
ARGUMENT

A.

The Draper Ordinance Created a Duty Toward Adam, Independent of Any
Common Law Duties, Because Adam Was a Member of the Class the
Ordinance Was Designed to Protect.
In its Opposition, Gateway makes a number of arguments about creation of duties

in Utah, which are addressed below. However, Gateway ultimately concedes that under
Utah law, Gateway can be liable to Adam under a public safety ordinance, independently
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of any duties under common law, if the ordinance protects a specific class of which
Adam is a member. (Opp'n at pp. 3, 47-48.)
This is not surprising in light of the well-established Utah law governing public
safety statutes which states that an independent duty can arise, regardless of common law
duties, where a party can show: "{l) the existence of the statute or ordinance, (2) the
statute or ordinance was intended to protect the class ofpersons which includes the
party, (3) the protection is directed toward the type of harm which has in fact occurred
as a result of the violation, and (4) the violation of the ordinance or statute was a
proximate cause of the injury complained of." Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850-51
(Utah 1981) (emphasis added) ("Warren I") and Hall v. Warren, 692 P.2d 737, 738-40
(Utah 1984) (" Warren II") (reversing the trial court's judgment adverse to plaintiff under
a building code ordinance and instructing that duties by a legislative enactment are
entirely independent and separate from common law duties); Torrie v. Weber County,
2013 UT 48, ,r,r 10-11, 309 P.3d 216; Tallman v. City ofHurricane, 1999 UT 55,985
P.2d 892, 897-98; Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 285,286, (1965) 874A (1979).
Notably, Gateway does not dispute that Appellants satisfy prongs (1), (3) and (4)
listed above. Gateway also does not dispute that the clear purpose of the Ordinance is to
"protect the health, safety and welfare of City residents ... " by eliminating ''potential
hazards to the public resulting from improperly constructed or installed signs. " It also
does not dispute Appellants' prior arguments that the Ordinance specifically required that
the electric signs be "maintained in good and safe structural condition, in compliance
with all building and electrical codes and in conformance with this code, at all times."
5
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(See also R.1050; 1056-57; 1126-27.) Furthermore, Gateway does not dispute

"maintained the sign in an unsafe condition in violation of the ordinance," and that Adam

4fv

was a resident of Draper City who was electrocuted due to Gateway's negligently
installed and operated electric sign. (R.357(n.3)); see also 1869.) Finally, Gateway does
not dispute that it was reasonably foreseeable that a trespasser such as Adam could be
injured or killed ifhe or she came into contact with various parts of Gateway's building
which were electrified due to the faulty sign.
Applying basic Utah law, and based on Gateway's own concessions, this Court
should find that Adam was in the class of persons to whom Gateway owed a duty under
the Draper Ordinance.

1.

Gateway's Argument That a Public Safety Ordinance Must Be
More Specific Than the Draper Ordinance in Order For a Duty
To Exist Is Without Merit.

While Gateway concedes that the Ordinance protects the class of Draper City
residents of which Adam was a member, Gateway ultimately argues that the Draper
Ordinance is too "general" and that legislative enactments must specify a more "narrow"
class than the Draper Ordinance does, in order to create duties. (Opp'n at pp. 3, 48.)
Gateway cites no Utah law for this proposition. Not surprisingly, Utah law (see prong (2)
above) does not limit the size of the "class" which a legislative enactment can seek to
protect. As demonstrated in the opening brief, this Court and courts in other jurisdictions
have imposed duties based on language concerning classes protected by "public safety"
enactments that is similar to the language found in the Draper Ordinance. (See

6
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Appellants' Opening Br. at pp. 18-23.) As discussed in Appellants' opening brief, this
Court's recent decision in Torrie, 2013 UT 48, is a compelling example.
In Torrie, this Court specifically found a duty was owed to fleeing suspects under
a public safety statute similar to Draper City Ordinance, to whom no duty was otherwise
owed. Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,I 11. However, in a strained attempt to distinguish Torrie,
Gateway argues that it was appropriate for the Court in Torrie to impose a duty toward
wrongdoers "in derogation of the common law" because the statute in Torrie was
purportedly more "narrow" than the Draper Ordinance. (Opp'n at pp. 48-49.) To that
end, Gateway states that the Torrie statute "narrowly" stated that it sought to protect "all
persons using the highways" as opposed to Draper City Ordinance which used the terms
"{Draper} City residents," ''people of the City" and ''public" to describe the class of

persons it intended to protect. (Id.; see also Appellants' Opening Br., Statement of
Material Facts ("SOF") ,I 5.) Gateway's argument is not well taken.
Gateway misstates the statute applied by the Torrie court. The Torrie court
applied Utah Code section 41-6a-212, which does not contain the language "all persons
using the highways." Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,I 11. In fact, as the Torrie court recognized,
section 41-6a-212 merely states that operators of authorized emergency vehicles had a
duty to "act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator in like circumstances ...
in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law." Id. 1 Based on that language

While the Torrie court discussed its prior decision in Day v State ex rel. Utah Dept. of
Public Safety, 1999 UT 46, ,I 14, 980 P.2d 1171, it clarified that the Day decision was
based on the prior statutory language, which unlike the Torrie statute, stated "all persons
using highways." Notably, even where section 41-6a-212 contained no language as to
1
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alone, the Court determined that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that the statute
intended to protect all members of the public, including the fleeing suspects. Id.
Ironically, the Draper Ordinance states quite explicitly that it was promulgated to
protect specifically the "[Draper] City residents" from faulty electric signs, while Torrie's
section 4 l-6a-212 does not contain such specific language. But even if the Torrie statute
stated it sought to protect "all persons using highways," this would not help Gateway
because such "class" would not be any more "narrow" than the class of Draper City
residents whom the Draper Ordinance seeks to protect. Logically, "all persons using
highways" could include persons driving, hitchhiking, or biking on the highways - which
essentially means all members of the "public" who may be in contact with highways. In
fact, the language "using highways" is superfluous because it would be absurd to expect
that the statute would seek to protect persons at their homes, when the statute deals with
highways. In the same fashion, the Draper Ordinance seeks to protect all Draper City
residents who may come into contact with public commercial buildings which are
electrified due to faulty electric signs. By the same token, this Ordinance, of course, was

not designed to protect people from electrified buildings who would not be in contact
with such building; i.e. a competitor complaining about an electric sign used by a
business across the street.

the protection of "all persons using the highways," the Torrie court found that the duty
imposed is "nearly identical" because, under either statute, fleeing suspects are members
of general public whom the statute sought to protect. Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,r 13.

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Gateway's Arguments Concerning Statutory Construction Are
Erroneous.

Gateway also adopts the Opinion's erroneous application of strict construction to
ordinances and argues that Torrie is inapposite because standard construction applies to
statutes and strict constriction applies to ordinances. {Opp'n at pp. 48-49, 53.) As

demonstrated in Appellants' opening brief, Gateway's (and the Opinion's) analysis is in
error. (See Appellants' Opening Br. at pp. 25-28.)
As a preliminary matter, Gateway's cited cases, like the cases cited in the Opinion,
specifically and only concerned zoning or land use ordinances and the issue of whether
these ordinances prohibited a "proposed use." See Carrier v. Salt Lake Cty., 2004 UT 98,
131, 104 P.3d 1208; Rogers v. W. Valley City, 2006 UT App 302, 115, 142 P.3d 554;
Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. OfAdjustment, 893 P.2d 602,606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Again, even in Patterson, on which both Gateway and the Opinion rely, the Court of
Appeals specifically warned that there could not be a strict interpretation of the zoning
ordinance as a whole where there were requirements related to promoting public health,
safety and welfare. 893 P.2d at 608; see also Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18,119, 2021, 70 P.3d 78 ("[i]n interpreting the meaning of ordinances, [courts] are guided by the

standard rules of statutory construction ... ") (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted). Here, Gateway does not argue that the Draper Ordinance impinged on
Gateway's "proposed use" or that Gateway wished to use the Electric Sign for some other
purpose not permitted by the Ordinance. As such, this line of cases is simply inapposite.

9
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However, it is ultimately of no consequence whether the Court applies strict or
standard construction to the Draper Ordinance because both require that the Court first
apply the plain meaning to the Ordinance. Therefore, the Torrie analysis is appropriate.
Indeed, in looking at the plain language of the Torrie statute which, like the Draper Sign
Ordinance, "did not carve out any exceptions for [wrongdoers such as] fleeing

suspects," this Court concluded that, like innocent third parties, even fleeing suspects are
included in the class of the general public to whom a duty is owed under the statute.

Torrie, 2013 UT 48,, 11 (emphasis added). The Court did not and could not restrict the
class which the statute sought to protect - the public who may reasonably be anticipated
to be harmed by vehicle operators' negligence. Id. at 112, n.18. The Court should, in
this case, also "decline to "depart from [its] established plain language analysis" and to
go out of its way to "carve out" an exception for certain members of the class
(trespassers) from the class of persons to whom the duty is owed under the Draper City
Ordinance. Id. 2
Contrary to the plain language of the Ordinance and the controlling Utah law, the
Court of Appeals did impennissibly carve out an exception for wrongdoers such as
trespassers. As explained in the opening brief, the Opinion did so based on its newly

2

Gateway also tries to distinguish Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,, 20, 179 P.3d
775, which instructs that under the plain language of a statute which derogates land user's
common law rights, the term "public" obviously includes even criminal trespassers, on
the grounds that Butler did not involve a safety enactment. (Opp'n at p. 52.) As stated
above, this distinction is inapposite. Certainly, the Torrie statute was a public safety
enactment, and in that case the Court found that even wrongdoers are members of the
public that the public safety enactment sought to protect.
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created, unprecedented standard of "strict construction" which the Court of Appeals
patched together based on antiquated and inapposite cases. The "new" standard is bad
law. As such, the Court of Appeals' ruling concerning duties owed to Adam under the
Draper City Ordinance should be reversed.

3.

Gateway's Remaining Arguments Concerning Duties Owed
Under an Ordinance Are Also Without Merit.

Gateway presented additional arguments which are meritless and immaterial in
light of Gateway's ultimate concession that, under Utah law, an ordinance can create a
duty to the members of a class which it seeks to protect. Appellants, nevertheless,
address those arguments.
For example, relying on a flawed premise that the Draper City Ordinance should
be considered a "general" safety ordinance, as opposed to a "specific" ordinance,
Gateway goes on to argue that "general safety ordinances ... do not create independent

duties in torf' because, if they did, "a homeowner would be liable to a burglar who is
injured in the crawlspace of the home due to a violation of a general safety code in the
crawlspace." (Opp'n at pp. at 3, 47 (emphasis added).) Gateway solely relies on

Davencourt At Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Assoc. v. Davencourt At Pilgrims
Landing, 2009 UT 65,221 P.3d 234 ("Davencourt"), for this proposition. However,
Davencourt does not stand for that proposition. Davencourt did not even involve any
personal injury, health or safety claims. Instead, it only concerned a plaintiffs
(unsuccessful) effort to avoid the economic loss rule for property damages under a safety
statute. Id.,, 43. In fact, contrary to Gateway's argument, the Davencourt court
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acknowledged that a duty can be created "to the public" by the safety statute such as the
statute inDavencourt. Id., 1143, 44 (emphasis added).
As demonstrated above, Gateway's argument is also directly undermined by Utah
cases, such as Warren I and Warren II, where this Court permitted recovery under a
similar public safety building ordinance and found that a duty was owed to persons under
the building code ordinance, independent of any common law duties. Warren I, at 85051; Warren II, at 738-40. Notably, in this case, Draper City even anticipated litigation
and explicitly stated in the Ordinance that there would be no limitation to recovery for
damages due to the violation of the Ordinance. See Draper City Ordinance (R.1141).
The scenario involving some "burglars in the crawlspace" and some hypothetical,
unknown, legislative enactment is not before the Court. Here, Draper City promulgated a
very specific ordinance concerning the use of commercial electric signs and did not carve
out trespassers from the class it sought to protect because trespassers, by definition, are
capable of making, and do make, contact with Draper City's commercial buildings. This
was especially foreseeable in Draper's busy, commercial areas such as Gateway's onestory strip mall where Gateway used its electric outdoor sign for advertising and
attracting business, and where, according to various Draper city officials, it was well
known that children climbed commercial buildings all over Draper. (R.903-904 (4 7 :848: 12); 1023 (96:5-13); 1026 (112:15-21); see also R.560 (29:23-30:4); 572 (77:2378: 1).) Of course, contacts with the outside parameters of a building could kill a
trespasser, an employee, or an invitee all the same, regardless of whether these persons
made contact with the electrified rain gutter immediately next to the main entrance to
12
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Gateway; the electrified one-story, easily accessible roof; or some other part of the
electrified building. It is common sense that Draper City intended to protect the lives of
each of those persons.
Likewise, Gateway's reliance on the antiquated 1926 case, Daley v. Salt Lake &
U.R. Co., 247 P. 293,294 (Utah 1926), for the proposition that there can be no duty to

trespassers under a statute is misplaced. As an initial matter, Daley does not even stand
for that proposition. Also, as stated before, Daley is inapposite as it relied on longrejected principles that wrongdoers cannot recover for injuries. See id. (finding that
court's error concerning a city ordinance jury instruction was harmless because there was
evidence to preclude the trespasser from recovering any judgment at all). Of course,
Gateway's (and the Opinion's) interpretation of Daley flies in the face of the wellestablished analysis which courts must apply, such as the analysis in Torrie.
Finally, Gateway tries to distinguish the numerous cases cited by Appellants
where courts found a duty to trespassers, independent of common law duties, arguing that
those cases were negligence per se jurisdiction, whereas Utah is a prima face negligence
jurisdiction. (Opp'n at pp. 47-48.) However, as an initial matter, some of those
jurisdictions were, in fact, "prima facie evidence" jurisdictions like Utah. See e.g. Allen
v. Dackman, 991 A.2d 1216, 1231 (Md. Ct. App. 20I0);Paulv. BlackburnLtd. P'ship,

63 A.3d 1107 (Md. Ct. App. 2013). In any event, Gateway tries to create a distinction
without meaning to this appeal. The distinction regarding negligence per se jurisdictions
concerns what the standard of care is - not whether a duty exists. See Thompson v. Ford,
395 P.2d 62, 33-34 (Utah 1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 286; 288A. It is
13
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undisputed that Gateway here breached the standard of care. In any event, as Gateway
itself ultimately conceded, a duty can be created toward a person "where the ordinance
protects a specific class" even in a "prima facie evidence" jurisdiction like Utah. (Opp'n
at pp. 3, 47.)

B.

This Court Should Also Reverse the Court of Appeals' Ruling As to
Appellants' Common Law Claims.

In addition to showing that Gateway owed a duty to Adam under the Draper City
Ordinance, Appellants also demonstrated to the lower courts that there are genuine issues
of material fact precluding summary judgment on Appellants' common law claims under
Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 334, 335 and 339.
However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed fundamental
procedural errors in their consideration of Appellants' common law claims. As a result,
the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed the trial court's finding that Gateway owed no
common law duties to Adam on the sole ground that Appellants purportedly did not
prove that, under Sections 334-339, Gateway knew or had a reason to know that children
were likely to trespass or that there were habitual trespassers onto Gateway's roof.

1.

Gateway's Arguments Concerning the Applicable Burdens on
Motions for Summary Judgment Are Wholly Erroneous.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely disregarded and
misapplied the basic Utah law governing evidentiary burdens on summary judgment. As
Gateway now admits, neither court imposed the initial burden on Gateway to demonstrate
an absence of genuine issues of material fact on various issues. (Opp'n at pp. 38-39.)
Also, they ignored, among other things, Gateway's explicit concession that there were
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genuine issues of material fact as to the question of whether Gateway knew that children
were likely to trespass onto its roof. (Opp'n at p. 36; R.357(n.3).)
Recognizing the errors in the Opinion concerning the parties' burdens on
Gateway's motion for summary judgment, Gateway first argues that this Court should not
address this problem because it did not grant review of the issue of burdens on the
summary judgment. (Opp'n at pp. 38-39.) However, the issue of burdens and the
application of correct standard on a motion for summary judgment is inherent in this
Court's analysis, and a necessary prerequisite before the Court can determine whether the
Opinion correctly ruled that Gateway had no knowledge or reason to lmow of the
trespassers.
Gateway then argues that the trial court and the Opinion applied the correct
standard governing motions for summary judgment. (Opp'n at p. 39.) However,
Gateway misconstrues the basic Utah law, which is stated in Rule 56(c)(l), Connor v.

Union Pac., 972 P .2d 414 (Utah 1998), and Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P .3d 600,
when it argues that Gateway had no burden and that the burden is "borne by the party
with the ultimate burden of proof at trial." (Opp'n at p. 39.) Again, Orvis could not be
clearer when it states:

Unless the moving party meets its initial burden ... 'the party opposing the
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue
of material fact for trial' ... Utah law does not allow a summary judgment
movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's
~ ' but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual
evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
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Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ,I 16 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Also, in Connor,
which specifically dealt with the issue of genuine issue of material fact as to habitual
trespassers, Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment,
explaining:
[B]efore determining whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the
court hearing the motion for summary judgment must be satisfied that the
moving party has met its burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.... In the instant case, the district court improperly granted
[defendant's] motion for summary judgment because [defendant] failed to
meet its burden.... For example, [defendant] states in its summary
judgment memorandum that ' [t ]here is no evidence indicating that
trespassers 'habitually' congregate, loiter or otherwise trespass the area of
track where plaintiff was injured.' [Defendant], however, fails to support
this argument with an affidavit or any other evidence. Its argument is
nothing more than a mere assertion, which is wholly insufficient to support
a summary judgment motion .... Because [defendant movant] failed to
show by affidavit or otherwise that the area where [plaindfD was injured
was not a limited area upon which trespassers constantly intruded, we
hold that there was a genuine issue of material fact and that the district
court erred in granting {defendant's] motion for summary judgment.

Connor, 972 P.2d at 418 (emphasis added).
Like the defendant in Connor, here Gateway failed to meet its initial burden to
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact with respect to the only issue
decided by the Opinion - whether Gateway knew or had reason to know that children
were likely to trespass onto its roof, or that persons habitually trespassed onto Gateway's
property. As stated above, Gateway conceded in its motion that Gateway knew or had a
reason to know that children were likely to trespass onto its roof. (R.357 n.3.) As such,
had the Opinion followed the basic principles iterated in Connor and Orvis, the burden
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should not have shifted to Appellants to demonstrate presence of genuine issues of
material fact on these issues.
While Gateway ultimately admits that the Court of Appeals erroneously found that
there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of whether children were
likely to trespass onto Gateway's roof,3 Gateway argues that its concession as to the issue
of likely children trespassers is irrelevant to the question of Gateway's belief as to the
likelihood of habitual trespassers on Gateway's roof. (Opp'n at pp. 26-27.) Not so. The
two issues are inextricably related because the fact that Gateway conceded that children
were likely to trespass demonstrates that Gateway also did not meet its initial burden of
demonstrating absence of genuine issue of material as to whether Gateway had reason to
lmow that persons habitually visited its roof.
Connor is instructive. In Connor, defendant conceded to even less than Gateway
did here, only generally arguing that, while there were trespassers in some neighboring
areas, defendant was simply unaware of any trespassers in the limited area in question.
Still, this Court found that was insufficient to demonstrate absence of issues of material
fact as to whether defendants had reason to lmow of habitual trespassers, and it refused to

3

Gateway argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider Gateway's
concession because Appellants allegedly failed to distinguish the Section 339 element
(that Gateway knew or had reason to lmow that children were likely to trespass) from
Section 334 and 335 elements (that Gateway lmew or had reason to know of habitual
trespassers). That is incorrect. See e.g. Apr. 7, 2015 Appellants' Opening Br., 2015 WL
12646934, at pp. 36-37; 48-50; Aug. 19, 2015 Appellants' Reply Br., 2015 WL
12646933, at pp. 15-17.
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shift the burden to plaintiff to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.
Connor, 972 P.2d at 418. The Court should do the same here.

2.

There is an Issue of Fact as to Whether Gateway Knew or Had
Reason to Know that Persons Habitually Trespassed Onto Its
Roof.

Notwithstanding Gateway's failure to meet its initial burden to demonstrate the
absence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gateway had a reason to know of
habitual trespassers, Appellants presented compelling arguments and evidence that there
are genuine issues of material fact on this element.

Certainly, Gateway's concession that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Gateway lmew that children were likely trespassing onto its roof, raises an issue
of fact under Restatement Sections 334 and 335 as to whether Gateway also lmew that
persons habitually trespassed onto Gateway's roof

So, in an effort to escape reversal, Gateway now, for the first time, argues that this
concession was not specific as to Gateway's roof, but that it "concerned only whether
youth are likely to access roofs- any roofs." (Opp'n at pp. 1-2.) But, this Court need
not look any further than the plain language of the pertinent subsection of the
Restatement and Gateway's original concession to see that Gateway is misstating the
facts. Indeed, the pertinent subsection of Restatement Section 339 states that "the place
where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to lmow

that children are likely to trespass." Clearly, this subsection refers to Gateway's roof, not
just any random place where children are likely to trespass.
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In addition to Gateway's concession as to the likely trespassing by children,
Appellants raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the knowledge of habitual
trespassers when they presented both direct evidence of two admitted instances of
trespass, and abundant circumstantial evidence. Indeed, Gateway's own board member
agreed that, based on what he understood, the roof was a "public" place. (R.560 (29:2330:4); 572 (77:23-78:1).) There was also evidence demonstrating that Gateway knew for
a long time that there had been a box by the ladder leading to the roof which made access
to this one-story building's roof even easier. (See R.792-93.) There were many instances
of persons loitering around the ladder, using graffiti, and even break-ins around the
ladder. Id. Based on the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
Appellants, the Opinion should have found that there were genuine issues of material fact
as to whether Gateway had a reason to know of habitual trespassers on its roof.
Instead, the Opinion created a bright-line rule that two instances of admitted
trespasses cannot be sufficient to create an issue of fact as to habitual trespassers,
regardless of any concessions or circumstantial evidence. The Opinion's disregard of the
circumstantial evidence presented by Appellants was in direct violation of the wellestablished law that all evidence must be viewed in totality. See Lopez v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 606 (Utah 1997) and Connor, 972 P.2d at 417-18. Relatedly, the

Opinion improperly instructs that courts should invade the province of a jury and weigh
the evidence in determining issues related to reasonableness and credibility. As
explained in the opening brief, the Opinion's analysis is flawed on numerous other
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grounds, warranting a reversal of the Court of Appeals' ruling. (Appellants' Opening Br.
at pp. 33-35.)
Notably, in its Opposition, Gateway concedes that the Opinion creates a brightline rule, but Gateway argues that it was appropriate for the lower courts to disregard all
circumstantial evidence and only consider the two admitted known instances of trespass.
(Opp'n at pp. 25-26.) Gateway relies on several cases from other jurisdictions, discussed
below. However, such cases are not helpful to Gateway, especially in light of Lopez and

~

Connor decisions which demonstrate that Utah law does not endorse such bright-line
rules governing landowner's reasonable belief as to likelihood of habitual trespassers on
its roof. Connor, 972 P.2d417-18 and Lopez, 932 P.2d at 605.
The cases cited by Gateway not only fail to support the Opinion's bright-line rule,
they are also distinguishable on various other material grounds. See e.g. City ofKansas

v. New York-Kansas Bldg., 96 S.W.3d 846,861 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (no evidence that
the building owner knew about any trespass); Seward v. Terminal, 854 S.W.2d 426, 429
(Mo. 1993) and Lindquist v. Albertsons, 748 P.2d 414 (Id. Ct. App. 1987) (single,

accidental trespass); Boyd v. Conrail, 677 A.2d 1182, 1187 (N.J. Super. 1996) (irrelevant
issue whether the area in question was "limited"); Politte v. Union Elec., 899 S.W.2d
590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (expressing it was "questionable" that Missouri courts
adopted Section 335 and focusing on whether the area was "limited"); Vega v. Northeast

Illinois Reg'/ RR, 863 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (inapposite, because Utah courts
have not required that a limited area must be a "beaten" or "well-worn path"); Burgess v.
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State, 74 A.3d 581, 587-91 (Conn. 2012) and Humphrey v. Glenn, 167 S.W.3d 680,685
(Mo. 2005) (defendants admitted they lmew of many trespassers).
This Court should remand this issue to the Court of Appeals and instruct that juries
(and certainly the court) must view all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the
light most favorable to Appellants. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, a
reasonable jury could, like Gateway's own board member, believe that Gateway had a
reason to know that its roof was treated by trespassers as a "public" place and as such,
that persons habitually trespassed onto Gateway's roof.
Where the Opinion applied the wrong evidentiary burden to the common law
elements and adopted a per se rule on the issue of habitual trespassers, and where
Appellants presented abundant circumstantial evidence on the issue of Gateway's
knowledge concerning habitual trespassers, this Court should reverse the Opinion's
ruling on the common law claims.

3.

This Court Should Decline Appellee's Request to Affirm Lower
Courts' Decisions On "Alternate Grounds."

On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court is limited to addressing only the rulings
by the Court of Appeals and, only the rulings which were specifically addressed in
Appellants' petition for writ of certiorari. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P .2d 852,
855 (Utah 1998) ("Review of certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals'
decision and is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petitions."); see also Utah
Code section 78A-3-102(5); Utah R. App. P. 45, 49(a)(4)("[o]nly the questions set forth
in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."); State
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v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 18, 76 P.3d 1159 ("on certiorari, [Supreme Court] review[s]
the decision of the court of appeals, not the ... trial court").
Appellee concedes that the Court of Appeals made only two specific rulings: (1)
that Gateway did not owe Adam a duty under the common law Restatement sections 334,
335 or 339 because Gateway allegedly did not know there were trespassers; and (2) that
Gateway did not owe a duty, independent of common law duties, to Adam under the
Draper City safety ordinance. (Opp'n at pp. 15-16.) Yet, in its brief, Appellee asks this
Court to affirm the trial court's decision based on "alternate grounds." Specifically,
Gateway argues that the Court can affirm the decisions below because, for example, (1)
the dangerous condition allegedly was unrelated to Gateway's activities (see Opp'n
sections 1.1.2 and 1.2.2); (2) because Gateway allegedly did not know about the
dangerous condition (Opp'n sections 1.1.3, 1.2.3, and 1.3.1); (3) and because Adam
allegedly realized that the condition on the roof would kill him (Opp'n section 1.3.2).
Putting aside the fact that there are genuine issues of material fact as to those
additional issues, this Court should strike those arguments because they were not
considered and not ruled on by the Court of Appeals. Additionally, none of the
arguments related to the proposed "alternate grounds" were "raised in [Appellants']
petition," nor did Gateway file a "cross petition" asserting such alternative grounds. See

Coulter, 966 P.2d at 855.
Appellee invites this Court to err when it cites Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 113,
52 P.3d 1158, for the proposition that this Court can affirm the Court ofAppeals on an

"alternate ground." Appellee completely misconstrues the Bailey decision. The Utah
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Supreme Court in Bailey stated that, when exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, it
"review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court.'" Bailey, 2002 UT
58,, 8 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Additionally, this Court in Bailey
specifically and only addressed the issue of whether the Court ofAppeal could affirm
"the trial court's order on alternate grounds." Id. at,, 11-13 (emphasis added). It had
nothing to do with issues related to a review on certiorari. Indeed, while Appellee' s
alternate arguments may have been acceptable had this Court retained original
jurisdiction and was directly reviewing the trial court's decision, Utah law is clear that
different rules apply on certiorari. See e.g. Coulter, 966 P.2d at 855.4 As such, this
Court should strike Gateway's "alternate grounds" arguments.

III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion should be reversed and Appellants should
be awarded their costs on appeal. Furthermore, this case should be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for issuance of a new opinion consistent with this Court's decision and
to address Appellants' other issues on appeal which were not addressed or fully resolved
by the Opinion.

4

Consistent with Coulter' s statement of the law, this Court has instructed that, for
example, where the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling without considering
alternate grounds argued by the appellee, the Supreme Court is not to consider alternate
grounds on certiorari, but to remand the case to the court of appeals to consider such
alternate grounds. See e.g. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,, 24, 100 P.3d 1222; State v.
Davis, 972 P.2d 388,395 (Utah 1998).
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DATED this 5th day of May, 2017.
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS
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